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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION:
AN EFFECTIVE ATTACK ON SPURIOUS
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS?
As the number of medical malpractice claimsfiled againstphysicians and
the size of damageawards continues to increase,physicians have sought various
methods to arrest these trends. One proposed remedy is a countersuit in
malicious prosecution by the physician against the originalplaintiff and his
attorney. The author examines the general requirements for success in
maliciousprosecutionactions and concludes thatjudicialreluctance to expand
the scope of the action would undermine much of its compensatory and
deterrent value if applied to spuriousmedical malpractice claims.

I.

INTRODUCTION

THE HUMAN ERRORS which prompted the proliferation of
medical malpractice suits of the 1960's, predominantly incidents
in which foreign bodies were left in patients following surgery, have
been largely compensated by the litigation of the early 1970's.
Physicians, aware of the growing number of cases and of the increasingly large verdicts being awarded,1 have begun to exercise

greater caution in their treatment of patients.2 Despite this practice

1. In the past decade in New York, the average cost of a malpractice claim
-awarded either by judge or jury, or resulting from an out-of-court settlement-grew from $6,000 to $23,400. Even more dramatic, however, has been
the sudden increase in outsize awards. Until last year Chicago had never
seen a malpractice judgment larger than $250,000 against a physician.
Since then, three awards in excess of $I million have been brought against
Chicago doctors, including one that totaled $2.5 million. In California,
there were only 5 judgments or awards for more than $300,000 in 1970,
but in 1974 there were 36. Of the 19 settlements or awards of more than
$1 million in the entire history of the state, 13 have come during the last
28 months.
NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 59.
2. As Eli Bernzweig, malpractice expert at HEW, noted:
There seems to be little doubt that the specter of malpractice litigation
has had a sobering effect upon many, if not most, physicians. It has
prompted them to be overly cautious in many areas of medical practice.
For example, it has become commonplace for physicians to order complete
X-ray studies of an injured limb even without the slightest indication of a
fracture. Needless to say, these X-rays can add $20 to $30 to the patient's
bill even though they may be unwarranted in 99 out of 100 cases.
SUBCOMM.

ON

EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION

OF THE SENATE COMM.

ON GOV'T

OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., lST SESS., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT
VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN, 22 (Comm. Print 1969); see Bernzweig, Defensive Medicine, in DEPT. OF HEW, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE, APP. 38 (1973); Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study
of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J. 939.
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of "defensive medicine," the total number of claims and the amount
of damages awarded continue to increase.3
Part of the cause, and cure, of the increase in malpractice suits
must reside with both the individual physician and the medical profession. The lack of self-discipline within the medical profession,
evidenced by its failure to reassess periodically the qualifications of
its members and sanction those unfit for practice, has inevitably led
to instances of inadequate treatment.4 In addition, the disappearance
of the intimate physician-patient relationship, which had operated as
a psychological salve to patients' wounds, has prompted those
patients to search for more formal procedures for airing their grievances. 5 Not unexpectedly, a greater demand for favorable results
has accompanied the significant advances in medical technology and
knowledge, but such advances have also increased the opportunity
for physician error.6 The number of malpractice suits consequently
continues to multiply and plague the profession.
The nature of the typical medical malpractice action has compounded the problem. Unlike other tort actions, the tort of medical
malpractice requires the introduction of expert testimony in establishing the standard of care.7 Consequently, although a patient
may have suffered an injury in fact, he may be unable to prove by the
requisite testimony that compensation should be granted. The
injury may not even be one for which the law allows compensation.
Nonetheless the suit may be brought, forcing the physician to defend
3. "Once an uncommon occurrence in tort law, more than 20,000 malpractice
claims are now brought against doctors each year and the number is rising steadily."
NEWSWEEK, supra note 1,at 59; see N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1975, § 1, at 41, col. 5.
4. Various sources estimate that 16,000 physicians are unfit to practice medicine, even though medical disciplinary boards expel an average of only 66 physicians
per year. Rensberger, Unfit Doctors Create Worry in Profession, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 26, 1976, at 1,col. I.
5. Ribicoff, Medical Malpractice: The Patient vs. the Physician, 6 TRIAL,
Feb.-Mar. 1970, at 10-11.
6. Perhaps even physicians would admit to the value of medical malpractice
suits. Aside from compensating the injured, such suits provide some degree of
social control over the medical profession, limiting an increase of exploitation over
the public and at the same time increasing public faith in the profession. The judicial
review provided by malpractice suits encourages change in the profession and, at
the same time, induces a higher standard of care. See Kretzmer, The Malpractice
Suit: Is It Needed?, II OSGOODE HALL L.J. 55, 65-69 (1973); Roemer, Controlling
and Promoting Quality in Medical Care, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 284, 297-98
(1970). Contra, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1975, § 1, at 41, col. 5. See generally SUBCOMM.
ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, supra note 2. For an analysis of the factors behind the increase in the number of malpractice cases, see King, Malpractice Prevention: A Bi-ProfessionalApproach, 1971 INS. L.J. 335.
7. Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 262, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372, 292
N.Y.S.2d 440, 447 (1968).
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against an action which may be devoid of legal basis or incapable of

proof.
Available statistical information suggests that a significant percentage of the malpractice claims filed lacks either a legal or factual
basis. 8 Various devices have been proposed and implemented 9 to
discourage the institution of medical malpractice suits which, although predicated upon injury, have no legal basis. However, the
present deterrent effect of these procedures appears to be limited °

and too contingent upon eventual acceptance by the public and the
medical profession to be significantly effective.

In a recent attempt to decrease the number of meritless medical
malpractice suits, some physicians have adopted a distinctly novel
approach: a countersuit for malicious prosecution against their
former patients and those patients' attorneys." This solution is
particularly attractive to physicians who, if successful, may recover
not only expenses reasonably incurred in the original defense, but
also damages for loss of business, injury to reputation, and mental
8. Data compiled by the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice on
claims files which were closed in 1970 indicate that approximately 60% of the total
number of incidents resulted in no payment to the claimant. Rudov, Myers &
Mirabella, Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims Files Closed in 1970, in DEP'T
OF HEW, supra note 2, at App. 14 (Table 2). According to a study of malpractice
suits filed in the Detroit area between 1970 and 1974, attorneys settle many cases
for reasons that seldom relate to the merits of the charges. N.Y. Times, Aug. 3,
1975, § 1, at 41, col. 5.
9. See generally, DEP'T OF HEW, supra note 2, at App. 214-493.
In 1972, there were approximately 20 screening panels in operation and 2 more
under consideration by state legislatures and medical and bar associations. The
goals and motives of these panels are "[t]o prevent where possible the filing in
court of actions . . . where the facts do not warrant a reasonable inference of
malpractice and to make possible the fair and equitable disposition of legitimate
claims." In jurisdictions where the public and the medical profession have enlisted the aid of these panels, the belief is that the practice of settling nuisance
claims has been partially reversed. Winikoff, Medical-Legal Screening Panels as an
Alternative Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV.
695, 705 (1972) (Documentary Supplement). See also A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 416-22 (1975); Gibbs, Malpractice Screening Panels and Arbitration in Medical Liability Disputes, I J. LEGAL MED., May-June 1973, at 30; Holder,
Joint Screening Panels, 215 J.A.M.A. 1715 (1971).
For a discussion of the effectiveness of arbitration as a remedy, see Zimmerly,
Is Arbitration the Answer?, I J. LEGAL MED., March-April 1973, at 48.
10. See generally Roth & Rosenthal, Non-Fault Based Medical Injury Compensation Systems, in DEPT. OF HEW, supra note 2, at App. 450.
11. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Terry, Civil No. 75-565-CA (Fla. Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 18,
1975); Rogers v. Hills, Civil No. W 76 G 268 L (Ill. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 29, 1976);
Balthazar & Schoenfield v. Dowling, Safanda & Reyes, Civil No. 76-L-799 (Il. Cir.
Ct., filed Jan. 23, 1976); Rogers v. Mirabella, Facktor, Mirabella & Kincaid, Civil
No. W 75 G 191 L (Ill. Cir. Ct., filed Jan. 23, 1976); Berlin v. Nathan, Civil No. 75
M2 542 (Il1. Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 22, 1975); Burkons v. Rogoff, Civil No. 953,503
(Ohio C.P., filed Mar. 9, 1976).
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suffering. 12 An action for malicious prosecution has the advantage
of not being circumscribed by constitutional strictures, as is, for
example, an action for defamation. Theoretically, it offers a maligned
physician the best method of obtaining damages and provides a
potential deterrent against the institution of spurious claims in the
future.
Malicious prosecution actions have, however, been disfavored in
law, particularly as countersuits to civil proceedings, and the courts
have evinced a general reluctance to expand the scope of their application. 3 Because of this reluctance, both the compensatory and
potential deterrent values of the action are unduly undermined.
Whether a physician who has been subjected to a medical malpractice
suit can prevail on a malicious prosecution claim remains to be seen.
This Note will attempt to answer whether such an action can surmount the difficult obstacles which the law has placed in its path.
II.

ELEMENTS OF AN ACTION FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

The action in tort for malicious prosecution provides an avenue
of redress for the maligned defendant who has been compelled to
defend against a spurious claim, but the effectiveness of the remedy
has been curtailed by the stringent limitations placed upon the cause
of action.' 4 Fearful that the threat of a counteraction for malicious
prosecution will deter the vindication of legal wrongs in the courtroom, the judiciary has restricted the availability of the remedy and
imposed strictly maintained proof requirements upon those to whom
the remedy is available:
Some margin of safety in asserting rights, though they turn
out to be groundless and their assertion accompanied by
some degree of ill-will, must be maintained. Otherwise
litigation would lead, not to an end of disputing, but to its
beginning, and rights violated would go unredressed for fear
of the danger of asserting them.5
In balancing the needs of the public to enter the courts without fear
of reprisal against the possible deterrent effects that an action for
malicious prosecution might have on spurious claims, the scales have
been tipped heavily in favor of the former. Although agreeing that
there is a need to protect adequately the defendant's right of redress,
the courts are unsure as to how that protection should be provided.
12. Carver v. Lykes, 262 N.C. 345, 352-53, 137 S.E.2d 139, 145 (1964).
13. See Part II infra.
14. Consumers Filling Station Co. v. Durante, 79 Wyo. 237, 249, 333 P.2d 691,
694-95 (1958), citing 34 AM. JUR. Malicious Prosecution § 5 (1941).
15. Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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A.

Majority vs. Minority View

The majority of jurisdictions follow the more liberal "American"
rule and permit the institution of a malicious prosecution action
following a civil suit, irrespective of whether theye has been actual
interference with the person or property of the defendant. 16 In these
jurisdictions, the plaintiff must allege that an original judicial or
quasi-judicial proceeding was instituted against him, which has
terminated in his favor and which was instituted without probable
cause and with malice. The concurrent establishment of these elements 17 presents enormous practical difficulties.
A sizeable minority of jurisdictions has adopted the English, or
"strict" rule, 8 which states that an action for malicious prosecution
will not lie in the absence of an arrest, an interference with property,
or some special injury which would not necessarily result in all
suits prosecuted for a like cause of action.' 9 Although subject to
16. Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1917); Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932); Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 66
Cal. 123, 4 P. 1106 (1884); Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084 (1932); Calvo
v. Bartolotta, 112 Conn. 396, 152 A. 311 (1930) (common law action for vexatious
suit, subsequently codified in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-568 (1958)); Tatum Bros.
Real Estate & Inv. Co. v. Watson, 92 Fla. 278, 109 So. 623 (1926); McCardle v.
McGinley, 86 Ind. 538 (1882); Carbondale Inv. Co. v. Burdick, 67 Kan. 329, 72
P. 781 (1903); White v. Dingley, 4 Mass. 433 (1808); Brand v. Hinchman, 68 Mich.
590, 36 N.W. 664 (1886); O'Neill v. Johnson, 53 Minn. 439, 55 N.W. 601 (1893);
Brady v. Ervin, 48 Mo. 533 (1871); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897);
Teesdale v. Liebschwager, 42 S.D. 323, 174 N.W. 620 (1919); Closson v. Staples,
42 Vt. 209 (1869).
17. See Turner v. J. Black & Sons, 242 Ala. 127, 5 So. 2d 93 (1941); Community
Nat'l Bank v. Burt, 183 So. 2d 731 (Fla. App. 1966); Kauffman v. A.H. Robins
Co., 223 Tenn. 515, 448 S.W.2d 400 (1969).
18. Prior to the passage of the Statute of Marlbridge in 1269, actions to recover
damages for suits maliciously prosecuted, where neither the person nor property
had been interfered with, were entertained by ,the English courts. Passage of the
Act foreclosed the institution of malicious prosecution suits arising out of a civil
action where there had been no arrest or seizure of property. To insure that its
passage would not displace preexisting damages at common law, however, the Act
proscribed the payment of costs to the defendant who prevailed in his action.
These costs were not limited to attorney fees, but included the fees of witnesses and
court officials and the honorarium of the barrister. In this manner a summary
remedy was provided in place of the existing cause of action. For a development
of the law of malicious prosecution in England, see Lipscomb v. Shofner, 96 Tenn.
112,33 S.W. 818 (1896).
19. Davis v. Boyle Bros., 73 A.2d 517 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950) (action termed
one for malicious use of process); Josey v. Grayson-Robinson, Inc., 90 Ga. App.

820, 84 S.E.2d 615 (1954) (action termed one for malicious use of process); Ammons
v. Jet Credit Sales, Inc., 34 Ill. App. 2d 456, 181 N.E.2d 601 (1962); Wetmore v.
Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 18 N.W. 870 (1884); Smith v. Smith, 296 Ky. 785, 178
S.W.2d 613 (1944); North Point Constr. Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 44 A.2d 441
(1945) (action termed one for malicious use of process); Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L.
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the same proof requirements as a claimant under the majority view,
a claimant in a minority jurisdiction must first allege that he has
suffered some special injury directly resulting from the original
proceeding, apart from the injury to his reputation or business which
accompanies the prosecution of all suits. 20 The special injury which
traditionally provided the basis for malicious prosecution actions
resulted from an attachment, an appointment of receiver, a writ of
replevin, or an injunction. 2' The court's special role in these particular procedures increased the interest of the court in preserving
the sanctity of its decisionmaking process, thereby prompting the
court to look more favorably upon an action against a plaintiff who
had abused the privilege of suing in court by bringing an unfounded
claim. To the defendant of a negligence action, who is unlikely to
be the victim of a special injury or an interference with property,
this requirement is particularly onerous.
Cognizant of the need for modifying the harshness of the minority rule, a number of jurisdictions have extended the definition
of special injury beyond its accepted meaning to include the loss of
a legally protected right, such as the right to practice a profession,22
the additional vexation of the successive instigation of suits, 23 and
the burden of defending an unconscionable appeal. 24 An increasing
number of jurisdictions also permit a malicious prosecution action
based upon the instigation of an administrative proceeding, including
professional disciplinary proceedings, where the proceeding is adjudicatory in nature and may adversely affect a legally protected
right. 25 Notwithstanding that such a proceeding is "not, strictly
377 (1816); Johnson v. Walker-Smith Co., 47 N.M. 310, 142 P.2d 546 (1943);
Burt v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 1, 73 N.E. 495 (1905); Ely v. Davis, 11l N.C. 24, 15 S.E.
878 (1892); Cincinnati Daily Tribune v. Bruck, 61 Ohio St. 489, 56 N.E. 198 (1900);
Mitchell v. Silver Lake Lodge, 29 Ore. 294, 45 P. 798 (1896); Muldoon v. Rickey,
103 Pa. -110 (1883); Abbott v. Thorne, 34 Wash. 692, 76 P. 302 (1904).
20. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 120, at 85 (4th ed.
1971).
21. Manufacturers & Jobbers Fin. Corp. v. Lane, 221 N.C. 189, 196, 19 S.E.2d
849, 853 (1942); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 4.2, at 303 (1956).
22. E.g., Rivers v. Dixie Broadcasting Corp., 88 Ga. App. 131, 76 S.E.2d 229
(1953); Carver v. Lykes, 262 N.C. 345, 137 S.E.2d 139 (1964).
23. Soffos v. Eaton, 152 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Shedd v. Patterson, 302
11. 355, 134 N.E. 705 (1922).
24. Holt v. Boyle Bros., 217 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
25. See Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423 (D.C. Cir. 1942); National Sur. Co. v.
Page, 58 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1932); Cassidy v. Cain, 145 Ind. App. 581, 251 N.E.2d
852 (1969); Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 113 A.2d 671 (1955); Kauffman v. A.H.
Robins Co., 223 Tenn. 515, 448 S.W.2d 400 (1969); Schier v. Denny, 9 Wis. 2d
340, 101 N.W.2d 35 (1960). See also Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal. 2d 577, 311 P.2d 494
(1957) (applying rule to a nonadjudicatory proceeding).
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speaking, either a criminal or a civil action, 26 these courts have
held that if the proceeding was instituted maliciously and without
probable cause, the injured party should have redress in an action
for damages.27
Inherent in the more lenient majority view toward malicious
prosecution actions is a consistent application of the tort principle
of compensatory damages. Since compensation is accorded one
who sues in vindication of his rights, it "seems most harmonious
with the standards which allow compensation generally" to extend
that compensation to one who must defend a suit in vindication of
his rights,28 particularly if the suit is brought maliciously and without
probable cause. An absolute bar to the action of malicious prosecution as a response to a wide variety of civil cases would favor the
rights of potential plaintiffs over those of potential defendants,
irrespective of improper motives or bad faith. Of course, it might
be contended that a plaintiff is as burdened when a defendant interposes a groundless defense as a defendant is in the defense of a
groundless claim. This argument, however,
[F]ails to distinguish between the position of the parties,
plaintiff and defendant, in an action at law. The plaintiff
sets the law in motion; if he does so groundlessly and maliciously, he is the cause of the defendant's damages. But
the defendant stands only on his legal rights-the plaintiff
having taken his case to court, the defendant has the privilege of calling upon him to prove it to the satisfaction of
the judge or jury, and he is guilty of no wrong in exercising this privilege.29
Unlike the plaintiff, the defendant is not in court of his own volition.
Even if the defendant prevails, he still has not emerged the victor.
He not only risks a monetary judgment, but his reputation is at stake
as well. In the prosecution of a spurious claim, the plaintiff has
perverted the legal process, 30 causing the defendant to incur these
risks needlessly, but he may nonetheless be shielded from liability:
[P]ublic policy requires that the honest plaintiff should not
be frightened from asking the aid of the law by the fear
of an extremely heavy bill of costs against him should he
lose. But this reason does not apply to the plaintiff who
seeks to harass, damage and even ruin the honest citizen by
26. National Sur. Co. v. Page, 58 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1932).
27. Id.
28. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element
of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 643 (1931).
29. Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 127, 4 P. 1106, 1109-10 (1884).
30. Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209, 220 (1869)..
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maliciously invoking the aid of the courts in support of a
claim which he knows to be unfounded. . . . [T]he same
public policy which requires the defendant to bear some of
the expense of an honest, even though unsuccessful, suit,
should give him a full and complete remedy against the dishonest and malicious litigant, and this can only be done
under our practice by an action of the nature involved here-

n.31

The policy behind the minority view is in sharp conflict with that
of the majority view. Apprehensive that the threat of a malicious
prosecution action will deter the vindication of rights, the minorityview courts have concluded that an outright rejection of the remedy
in civil cases where special injury cannot be alleged is the only
method of insuring recourse to the judicial process for the settlement
of grievances.32 Concomitantly, these jurisdictions have adopted
the English rule of statutory costs, which limits costs to the fees of
witnesses and court officials, as the sole "measure of damages in a
mere civil action of a successful defendant."3 3 While the imposition
of statutory costs may at one time have afforded adequate compensation for the expenses necessary to a defense, thus providing
the defendant with some remedy, the allotment is sorely inadequate
today. 34 Nonetheless, the minority-view jurisdictions maintain that
the threat of deterrence is too great, and judicial enforcement of
high proof thresholds too speculative, to permit an adoption of the
majority's compromise position.
The necessity of preserving the minority position is not apparent.
Although the potential countersuit in malicious prosecution might
conceivably deter the honest claimant from a vindication of his
rights, there is a dearth of empirical data confirming this fear or
indicating a marked decline in the number of original prosecutions
filed in the jurisdictions which have adopted the liberal majority
31. Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 114, 15 P.2d 966, 967 (1932).
32. See Wetmore v. Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 744-45, 18 N.W. 870, 871 (1884);
Muldoon v. Rickey, 103 Pa. 110 (1883).
33. Lipscomb v. Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112, 114, 33 S.W. 818, 819 (1896); see
Pope v. Pollock, 46 Ohio St. 367, 371, 21 N.E. 356, 357 (1889).
The English system of costs was transplated in the United States prior to the
American Revolution. Professor McCormick suggested that this rule complemented a demand in frontier America for fair play and equality in the courtroom,
where "two inflamed citizens [could exchange] blows upon the courthouse square,"
undeterred by the threat of an onerous bill of costs to the loser. McCormick, supra
note 28, at 642. However, the conditions from which the rule developed-i.e., the
phenomenon of "court week," when the circuit judge came to a given town, and
the spectacular entertainment that court week provided-no longer exist in the urban
setting of the 20th century.
34. Id. at 620-21.
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view.35 Courts which posit deterrence of legitimate claims as a
justification for the limitation on malicious prosecution actions assume its validity only by judicial notice, and do not support it by
practical results.36 The difficulty with the justification stems from
its assumption that the main deterrent to a potential litigant is the
threat of a countersuit in malicious prosecution. The payment of
costs incidental to an unsuccessful suit, as well as the time demanded
in the prosecution of any claim, constitute sufficient barriers to the
institution of legitimate and frivolous suits, without further discouraging the assertion of rights.37
Implicit in the fear of permitting malicious prosecution actions is
a vision of the interminable suit-litigation which "would lead, not to
an end of disputing, but to its beginning." 38 This conclusion, however, lacks a pragmatic basis: "Such fears have little foundation,
as the party who has sustained the burden of one action will be unlikely to assume so quickly the expense of a second suit unless he is
reasonable [sic] assured of success." 39

Furthermore, an admission

of the merits of these contentions would not require a foreclosure of
the remedy of an action in malicious prosecution, but a tightening
of the proof requirements which bar the path to success.
The assertion that the value of malicious prosecution actions lies
only in their possible deterrent effects on the institution of spurious
suits disregards the need to protect and compensate those maligned
by a misuse of the legal process. The value that has been placed on
the right to bring a cause of action must be considered in light of
both the interest of the "peaceful citizen" to be free from vexation,
damage, and possible ruin, 40 and the interest of the courts in promoting the honest use of the judicial process:
Every citizen has three important interests which, among
others, are protected by the law of torts-his interest in reputation and honor, his interest in bodily freedom, and his interest in financial security. A tort action for defamation
35. For a study of malicious prosecution actions in a state adopting the liberal
view, see Comment, Malicious Prosecution in Tennessee, 29 TENN. L. REv. 552

(1962).
36. A comment directed at this issue by the Alabama Supreme Court in 1917
suggests that at least at that time "IThe testimonies of the judges in other jurisdictions concur to the effect that this rule has brought to the courts no crowd of
rashly importunate litigants [in actions for malicious prosecution]." Peerson v.
Asheraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 349, 78 So. 204, 205 (1917).
37. See Note, Advertising, Solicitation & the Profession's Duty to Make Legal
Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1189 (1972).
38. Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
39. 31 N.D.L. REv. 283, 287 (1955).
40. Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 468, 71 N.W. 558, 560 (1897).
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provides protection for the first of these, while an action for
false imprisonment protects the second. An action for
malicious prosecution protects all three.4
The paramount value of the malicious prosecution action is thus the
protection it affords to every individual. Even though the majority
view comes closer to providing this protection than the minority view,
the requirement that the defendant establish termination, lack of
probable cause, and malice before the action can be sustained demonstrates the difficulty inherent in utilizing that protection.
B.

Termination

A claim for malicious prosecution must await the termination
favorable to the defendant of the proceeding on which it is based
before a cause of action will accrue.42 This requirement effectively
forecloses the initiation of counterclaims for malicious prosecution
during the pendency of the original action, 43 whether the counterclaim seeks damages or a declaration of malice and want of probable
cause. 44 Despite general agreement that termination does not require an adjudication on the merits, 45 judicial opinion is not uniform
in its characterization of what constitutes termination "in favor of'
the original defendant.
The dismissal of a criminal complaint by the court 46 or the entry
of a nolle prosequi by the prosecutor, without the request of or
agreement with the defendant,47 is sufficient evidence of a favorable
termination:
It is not necessary that the proceeding should have gone so
far as to preclude further prosecution on the ground of double
jeopardy. Hence, although the quashing of an indictment
does not preclude the initiation of new proceedings for the
same offense .. .it constitutes a termination of the original proceeding in favor of the accused unless such new

41. Note, Malicious Prosecution-The Law in Arkansas, 22 ARK. L. REv. 340
(1968).
42. See, e.g., Embassy Sewing Stores, Inc. v. Leumi Financial Corp., 39 App.
Div. 2d 940, 333 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1972); Reichler v. Tillman, 21 N.C. App. 38, 203
S.E.2d 68 (1974).
43. Luckett v. Cohen, 169 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
44. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179
(1971).
45. See Crawford v. Theo, 112 Ga. App. 83, 143 S.E.2d 750 (1965); Mayflower
Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139, 83 A.2d 246 (Ch. 1951).
46. See Overson v. Lynch, 83 Ariz. 158, 317 P.2d 948 (1957).
47. See v. Gosselin, 133 Conn. 158, 48 A.2d 560 (1946); Davis v. McCrory
Corp., 262 So. 2d 207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
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proceedings have been initiated before the trial of the civil
action. .

..

In civil actions, either a termination not adverse to or a decision

favorable to the defendant, as distinguished from judgment on the
merits, is similarly sufficient evidence of termination. 49

The dis-

tinction between the termination requirements of criminal and civil
actions is that a nolle prosequi is presumptive evidence of favorable

termination, but its civil analogue, a voluntary dismissal, is not.
Acknowledging inherent differences between criminal and civil ac-

tions and the relative ease with which civil proceedings may be
instituted, courts on occasion have required additional evidence of
an intention to terminate prior to permitting a subsequent action

in malicious prosecution.
The rationale in support of the termination rule is three-fold.

First, without the termination rule, the resulting institution of
counterclaims, which are less time-consuming and expensive than

original prosecutions, would foster the expansion of a cause of action which the courts disfavor.51 Second, the termination rule pre-

vents inconsistent judgments, avoiding the result that a plaintiff
might conceivably win his original action and yet lose the counterclaim for malicious prosecution.52

Third, if it were not for the

termination rule, the introduction of evidence establishing want of
probable cause and malice might prejudice the case of the original

plaintiff. The plaintiff and his attorney would be placed in adverse
positions as cross-defendants in those instances where the malicious

prosecution action is directed at both. Additionally, because the
elements of malice and want of probable cause are difficult to establish, an adjudication on these issues would be hindered by the
53
absence of an original record from which evidence could be taken.
Balanced against the rationales in favor of the termination rule

are the arguments of judicial economy and justice. Under liberalized
48. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 659, comment a at 396 (1938).
49. Cf. Alexander v. Petty, 35 Del. Ch. 5, 108 A.2d 575 (1954). Compare
Hernon v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Mo. 1973) with
Patete v. Baker, 14 Ill. App. 3d 385, 302 N.E.2d 416 (1973) on the question of
whether a dismissal by agreement of the parties is evidence of a favorable termination.
50. E.g., McFarland v. Union Fin. Co., 471 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971);
Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897); Brown v. Liquidators, 152 Ore.
215, 52 P.2d 187 (1935). See also Bard v. Aluminum Seal Co., 250 F.2d 595 (3d
Cir. 1957) (requiring additional proof of a lack of intent to prosecute).
51. Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 846-47, 479 P.2d 379, 383-84, 92.
Cal. Rptr. 179, 183-84 (1971).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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procedural rules, a counterclaim need not arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's claim. 4 Absent a
requirement of termination, the procedure for handling the malicious
prosecution counterclaim could be tailored to maximize judicial
economy. Since the underlying facts and essential testimony are
likely to originate from the same or similar sources, pretrial discovery could be combined in order to permit investigation into both
causes of action, thus saving time, expense, and further overcrowding
of the docket. 5 The counterclaim would be filed in the original
action, but adjudication of the claim could be postponed until the
disposition of the original action, thus avoiding unwarranted litigation. It follows, that a cause of action would not arise unless and
until the prior proceedings had terminated, but a petition would be
allowed during the pendency of the original action. 6 If the cause
of action did arise, the same jury would be retained, whenever possible, to hear the trial on the counterclaim. Such a procedure would
be analogous to that in indemnity proceedings, in which a defendant
seeks a declaration of rights prior to an adjudication of his own
obligation. 7
Case law, however, has not favored changing the termination
requirement. In Babb v. Superior Court,58 the California Supreme
Court, ruling on a demurrer to a cross-complaint in malicious prosecution filed pending an action in medical malpractice, found the
policy reasons supporting abolition of the termination requirement
to be unconvincing and the analogy to indemnity proceedings to be
unsupportable. After noting a "metaphysical" difficulty in permitting a counterclaim in malicious prosecution,59 the court set forth
the administrative and policy reasons for retaining the termination
rule. Countering the analogy to indemnity proceedings with key
distinctions between the two causes of action, the court noted the
absence of a deterrent or harassing effect in the indemnity cross-ac54. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b) (providing for permissive as well as compulsory counterclaims).
55. Brief for Appellant at 14, Curran v. Lake Shore Elec. Corp., No. 75-940,
525 (Ohio C.P., filed Mar. 21, 1975).
56. Id.
57. See Rimington v. General Accident Group, 205 Cal. App. 2d 394, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 40 (1965); Sattinger v. Newbauer, 123 Cal. App. 2d 365, 266 P.2d 586 (1954).
58. 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971).
59. Theoretically a cause of action in malicious prosecution does not exist prior
to termination. Id. at 846-47, 479 P.2d at 383-84, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 183-84. The
court has suggested, however, that such a cross-action might be permissible in the
event of a joint pretrial statement that, where judgment is rendered in favor of the
defendant, the issue of whether the action has been maliciously prosecuted would
be decided. Id. at 849-50, 479 P.2d at 383-84, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 183-84.

1976]

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

tion. Unlike the action in malicious prosecution, the indemnity
claim is instituted against a third party and arises out of the same
transaction as the principal action. In the counterclaim for malicious
prosecution, however, evidence is aimed at the motives and state of

mind of the original plaintiff, and not at the substantive issues of
the original action.
There has, nonetheless, been some indication of a willingness to
depart from the termination requirement pursuant to equitable
principles. In Herendeen v. Ley Realty Co.,6 0 a New York court
permitted the institution of the counterclaim, asserting:

[I]t is the malicious prosecution itself, and not the determination that the prosecution is malicious, which gives rise to
the cause of action; that the requirement

. . .

that the

determination precede the commencement of an action for
damages is based upon considerations of justice and convenience; and that justice and convenience are promoted by
in
allowing a counterclaim for such damage to be interposed
61
the action claimed to constitute malicious prosecution.
However compelling this opinion may appear, subsequent New

York courts have not acquiesced in its logic, 62 and the termination
rule has lost none of its vitality.
C.

Probable Cause

A claimant who reasonably 63 believes in the existence of facts
under which his claim may be valid at common law or under an
64
existing statute has probable cause for the institution of a suit.
In other words, probable cause is present when "such a state of facts

60. 75 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
61. Id. at 838.
62. See Embassy Sewing Stores, Inc. v. Leumi Financial Corp., 39 App. Div.
2d 940, 333 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1972). Reasoning expanding the premise of Herendeen
has been adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Connecticut in Sonnichsen v.
Streeter, 4 Conn. Cir. 659, 239 A.2d 63 (1967), and by the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division in Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139,
83 A.2d 246 (Ch. 1951), suggesting the possibility of interjecting the counterclaim
but withholding its disposition until adjudication of the first action.
63. Although the reasonable-man standard is generally the test applied to civil
proceedings, the "cautious-man" standard, frequently used in criminal cases, has
been suggested and applied to some civil proceedings. See Ray v. City Bank &
Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Woods v. Standard Personal Loan
Plan, Inc., 420 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967). The effect of this formulation
may be most pronounced in respect to the investigation requirement prior to the
institution of an action. See text accompanying notes 67-71 infra.
64. E.g., Title Guar. Co. v. Harmer, 482 P.2d 430 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Gray
v. Abboud, 184 Okla. 331, 87 P.2d 144 (1939); Kunz v. Johnson, 74 S.D. 577, 57
N.W.2d 116 (1953).
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exists as would warrant institution of the suit or proceedings complained of' as legally just and proper.65 A successful malicious
prosecution action depends upon the ability to demonstrate that
the original claimant against whom the malicious prosecution action is brought instituted his claim without probable cause, i.e., without a reasonable belief in the viability of his claim. This issue is
viewed in light of both the objective reasonableness of the claimant
and his actual belief in his claim.
An appraisal of the claimant's reasonableness based on an objective standard focuses upon the "effects and circumstances" of
which the claimant was aware at the time the proceedings were
instituted.66 Courts which have formulated their standard in terms
of the "cautious man 67 in lieu of the "reasonable man" have also
inquired into the circumstances of which the claimant "should, upon
reasonable inquiry, have been aware., 68 Prior to the filing of a
complaint, the plaintiff is not required to exhaust all sources of
information bearing on the facts within his knowledge 69 or to continue his investigation subsequent to filing.70 Yet even though the
fullest investigation possible is not mandated, if a recitation of the
facts "excluded recitation of those facts, if any, which might reasonably have incited further investigation or inquiry,'
probable
cause will be found to be lacking.
A complete and honest disclosure to an attorney of all facts
known to the claimant when the claim was instituted strongly establishes the existence of probable cause for that proceeding, provided that the attorney sought is a reputable one and the client acts
in good faith reliance upon his advice. 72 The solicitation of legal
advice, accompanied by good faith reliance, is demonstrative of a
reasonable effort to discern the viability of a claim from one who
allegedly can appraise it.73 The "mistaken belief as to the legal
consequences of a person's conduct ' 74 of one ignorant of the law
does not furnish evidence of probable cause, no matter how reason65. North Point Constr. Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 208-09, 44 A.2d 441, 445
(1945), citing Owens v. Graetzel, 149 Md. 689, 132 A. 267 (1926).
66. Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
67. See note 63 supra.
68. Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
69. Brock v. Southern Pac. Co., 86 Cal. App. 2d 182, 195 P.2d 66 (1948).
70. Centers v. Dollar Mkts., 99 Cal. App. 2d 534, 222 P.2d 136 (1950).
71. Williams v. Frey, 182 Okla. 556, 78 P.2d 1052 (1938).
72. Sazdoff v. Bourgeois, 301 So. 2d 423 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Williams v.
Frey, 182 Okla. 556, 78 P.2d 1052 (1938).
73. Sazdoffv. Bourgeois, 301 So. 2d 423 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
74. Vasser v. Berry, 85 Ga. App. 435, 436, 69 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1952).
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able the belief may be.75 Conversely, good faith reliance on the
advice of counsel, no matter how mistaken that advice may have
been, is conclusive as to probable cause.76
If the client has acted in bad faith, either through a misfeasance
in the failure to relate all relevant facts, a malfeasance in the recitation
of false information,77 or a recitation of a claim in which he does not,
in good faith, believe, 78 he has demonstrated the lack of a good faith
belief in the viability of his claim, and thus meets neither the objective nor the subjective test of probable cause. Consequently,
the affirmative defense of advice of counsel will be unavailable to
him:
[E]ven though a defendant [to a malicious prosecution action] shows reasonable grounds of suspicion, sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief
that there was probable cause for the [original] prosecution,
nevertheless, if it be apparent that he did not himself believe
in the guilt of the accused, then the circumstances upon
which he relied will not suffice to shield and vindicate him.79
If sufficient evidence is offered to warrant a conclusion that the plaintiff
did not in fact believe in the merit of his claim, the question of
probable cause is decided by the jury. 80
The burden of establishing want of probable cause by a preponderance of the evidence is on the plaintiff."1 In civil actions there
is a presumption that prosecutions are instituted with probable
cause, although that presumption is weaker in civil actions than in
criminal actions.82 Ordinarily a determination on the existence of
probable cause is made by the jury. If, however, the facts are not
in dispute and the available evidence permits only a finding of
probable cause, the determination is made by the court.83
Despite protestations that legal cause and probable cause are
not one and the same,8 4 courts have consistently held that a judg75. Id.
76. Kunz v. Johnson, 74 S.D. 577, 583, 57 N.W.2d 116, 119 (1953), citing 54
C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 53 (1948).
77. Tool Research & Engineering Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120
Cal. Rptr. 291 (1975).
78. Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 184 (1974); Franzen v. Shenk, 192 Cal. 572,221 P. 932 (1924).
79. Id. at 579, 221 P. at 934-35.
80. Centers v. Dollar Mkts., 99 Cal. App. 2d 534, 222 P.2d 136 (1950).
81. Hunter v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 129 W. Va. 302, 40 S.E.2d 332
(1946).
82.. Id.
83. See Johns v. Gibson, 80 Ga. App. 585, 4 S.E.2d 480 (1939); Williams v.
Frey, 182 Okla. 556, 78 P.2d 1052 (1938).
84. Id.
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ment adverse to the defendant in the original proceeding is conclusive as to the existence of probable cause for that proceeding.8"
Based on an objective standard of reasonableness, proceedings which
86
terminate in victory are, by virtue of their success, well-founded.
Because the identity of the parties in the original suit and the malicious prosecution action is likely to be the same, one court has
likened the situation to an estoppel,87 requiring the parties to litigate
the existence of probable cause in the original contest or be estopped
to deny its presence. Yet, while promoting a judicial policy disfavoring the action of malicious prosecution, this legal fiction necessarily conflicts with a policy underlying the termination requirement, which is the postponement of debate on the issues of malice
and probable cause until a later proceeding in order to minimize the
prejudice to either side. By accepting what is essentially the jury's
assessment of probable cause, however, the courts have ignored one
of the two aspects of the probable cause test: the plaintiff's subjective assessment of the original claim. Furthermore, the adoption
of this view is not mandated by legal necessity, but is prompted by a
sense of public policy. Inherent in its adoption is a desire to preserve the authority of judicial tribunals by investing their procedures
and determinations with such "force and sanctity" that they act as
a "shield and protection to all parties and persons in privity with
them. , 8
Even though a victory for the plaintiff is thought to prove the
presence of probable cause, the converse does not follow: a judgment adverse to him does not establish a prima facie case of want
of probable cause for that action, 89 even where the judgment is
predicated upon a mistake of law.90 An adverse determination is
thus indicative only of an objective evaluation of the merits at the
time of filing. Extending this analysis, it would seem that a volun85. An adverse judgment is conclusive evidence of probable cause unless evidence is presented of fraud, perjury, or other improper means, notwithstanding
that the judgment is later reversed on appeal. E.g., Boothby Realty Co. v. Haygood, 269 Ala. 549, 114 So. 2d 555 (1959); Goldstein v. Sabella, 88 So. 2d 910
(Fla. 1956); Owens v. Graetzel, 149 Md. 689, 132 A. 265 (1926). But see Nisewanger
v. W.J. Lane Co., 75 N.D. 448, 28 N.W.2d 409 (1947), holding that an adverse
judgment does not preclude investigation into probable cause, even where the
original judgment was based on a question of law.
86. See Ripley v. Bank of Skidmore, 355 Mo. 897, 198 S.W.2d 861 (1947).
87. Herman v. Brookerhoff, 8 Watts 240 (Pa. 1839).
88. Crescent City Livestock Co. v. Butchers' Union Slaughter-House Co.,
120 U.S. 141, 159 (1887).
89. See Kassan v. Bledsoe, 252 Cal. App. 2d 810, 60 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1967);
Fowle v. Fowle, 263 N.C. 724, 140 S.E.2d 398 (1965).
90. Nisewanger v. W.J. Lane Co., 75 N.D. 448, 28 N.W.2d 409 (1947).

19761

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

tary dismissal by the plaintiff would be insufficient evidence of want
of probable cause.91 Nonetheless, a limited number of jurisdictions

regard the voluntary
dismissal as raising a presumption of want of
92
probable cause.

D. Malice

Malice is not only an essential element of malicious prosecution,
but the very core of the action.93 An understanding of malice is,
however, plagued by the many meanings attributed to the expression
by the law and by the vagueness and ambiguity which those mean-

ings have engendered.94 Contrary to common misconceptions, proof
of deliberate violence or apprehension is not required to bring a
malicious prosecution action. Proof of an intentional or willful act
which attempts to bring about a wrongful result, however, will be

sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury.95
When a claimant evidences ill will, anger, or a desire to vex,
there is actual malice, or malice in fact.96 In many jurisdictions,
actual malice also includes the prosecution of a case undertaken for
improper or collateral motives, i.e., motives other than the motive
of securing justice.97 Improper motive may be established by
evidence of hostility or ill will, the hope of obtaining a private
advantage, or the absence of a bona fide belief of fault.9 Jurisdic-

tions which do not denominate this improper motivation as "actual
malice" refer to it as "legal malice." 99 In those jurisdictions, such a
finding satisfies the malice requirement for malicious prosecution,
since legal malice stemming from improper motivation is equivalent

to actual malice.
Proof of malice need not be direct, but may be inferred from
91. See Smith v. Burrus, 106 Mo. 94 (1891); Novick v. Becker, 4 Wis. 2d
432, 90 N.W.2d 620 (1958).
92. E.g., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Ohio 1973);
Wetmore v. Mellinger, 64 Iowa 741, 14 N.W. 722 (1883); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D.
461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897); Brown v. Liquidators, 152 Ore. 215, 52 P.2d 187 (1935).
93. Konas v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 158 Colo. 29, 404 P.2d 546 (1965); Wilson
v. O'Neal, 118 So. 2d 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
94. Fridman, Malice in the Law of Torts, 21 MODERN L. REV. 484 (1958).
95. Note, Malicious Prosecution-The Law in Arkansas, 22 ARK. L. REV. 340,
352 (1968).
96. See Hudson v. Zumwalt, 64 Cal. App. 2d 866, 149 P.2d 457 (1944);

Peasley v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 13 Wash. 2d 485, 125 P.2d 681 (1942).
97. Cook v. Lanier, 207 N.C. 166, 147 S.E.2d 910 (1966).
98. See Wilson v. Dunaway, 112 Ga. 241, 144 S.E.2d 542 (1965); Hill v.
Carlstrom, 216 Ore. 300, 338 P.2d 645 (1959).
99. See, e.g., Peasley v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 13 Wash. 2d 485, 125
P.2d 681 (1942); Meyer v. Ewald, 66 Wis. 2d 168, 224 N.W.2d 419 (1974).
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the circumstances surrounding the defendant's act. In the great
majority of jurisdictions, malice may be inferred entirely from facts
and circumstances indicating a lack of probable cause,' 00 although
the inference is at most permissive and is subject to negation by
proof of the absence of actual malice.' 0 ' Great indifference to the
person, property, or rights of another may evince a hostile or vindic0 2
tive motive from which an inference of malice may be drawn.
Similarly, a suit instituted without a bona fide belief in its viability
or prosecuted for the purpose of obtaining a private advantage over
the defendant may demonstrate improper conduct. 10 3 "In a legal
sense any unlawful act done willfully and purposely to the injury
of another is, as against that person, malicious; the proof of malice
need not be direct but may be inferred from circumstances."'0 4
Because this inference is sufficient to obtain a jury instruction on
malice, few cases touch directly on what is required to prove actual
malice.'0 5
If the defendant .. .did not act as a man of caution and
prudence impartially, reasonably and without prejudice
and malice or a desire to gain an undue advantage of the
plaintiff, [the jury] may find that the order was issued without probable
cause and may infer malice on the part of the
10 6
defendant.

As with other matters left to the jury, it may be easier to obtain an
instruction than a favorable verdict, and unless the verdict is clearly
erroneous, little is left for appeal.

100. See, e.g., Tanner-Brice Co. v. Baris, 55 Ga. App. 453, 190 S.E. 676 (1937);
Stubbs v. Mulholland, 168 Mo. 47, 67 S.W. 650 (1902); Delgado v. Rivera, 40
N.M. 217, 57 P.2d 1141 (1936); Melanowski v. Judy, 102 Ohio St. 153, 131 N.E.
360 (1921); Hyde v. Southern Grocery Stores, 197 S.C. 263, 15 S.E.2d 353 (1941).
A number of courts have required some independent evidence of bitterness,
animosity, or vindictiveness before permitting an inference of malice. See Hudson v. Zumwalt, 64 Cal. App. 2d 866, 149 P.2d 457 (1944); Ahring v. White, 156
Kan. 60, 131 P.2d 699 (1943); Barker v. Waltz, 40 Wash. 2d 866, 246 P.2d 846
(1952). See also Hunter v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 129 W. Va. 302, 40 S.E.
2d 332 (1946), requiring the establishment of want of probable cause by a preponderance of the evidence prior to permitting the inference of malice.
101. See Wesko v. G.E.M., Inc., 272 Md. 192, 321 A.2d 529 (1974).
102. Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974).
103. See Hill v. Carlstrom, 216 Ore. 300, 338 P.2d 645 (1959); Peasley v. Puget
Sound Tug & Barge Co., 13 Wash. 2d 485, 125 P.2d 681 (1942).
104. Note, Malicious Prosecution-The Law in Arkansas, 22 ARK. L. REV. 340,
353 (1968), quoting Lemay v. Williams, 32 Ark. 166 (1877).
105. Note, Malicious Prosecution-The Law in Arkansas, 22 ARK. L. REv. 340
(1968).
106. Id. at 353, quoting Lemay v. Williams, 32 Ark. 166 (1877).
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Malicious Prosecution Actions Against the Attorney

E.

An attorney "enjoys immunity from liability to third persons insofar as he does not materially depart from his role as a quasi-

judicial officer, charged with responsibility for the administration of
justice."'

7

In the performance of his duties to a client and in ful-

fillment of his responsibility to the court, an attorney is required only
to entertain a reasonable and honest belief that his client has a viable
claim for which probable cause exists.10 8 An attorney is obligated to

present a claim if, in his estimation, the client has a good cause of
action. 10 9 He is not, however, authorized to advance a claim that
is not warranted under existing law, unless that claim is supportable

i07. Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 241, 28 N.W.2d 780, 791 (1947).
An alternative solution to the problem of spurious claims is strict enforcement
by the judiciary of the provisions of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Code provides a set of ethical guidelines for the attorney to follow in his
relationships with his client, with the public, and with his profession. Canon I
requires that an attorney "assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of
the legal profession." The attorney is faced with a possible conflict, however, as
he attempts to perform the duty expressed in Canon 7: "A lawyer should represent
a client zealously within the bounds of the law." Although the Code envisions
these duties as complementary, the partisanship of the attorney may preclude a
consideration of his duty to the public.
The Code does not clearly state the distinction between permissible and impermissible conduct in the filing of claims. The conflict is best expressed through
the juxtaposition of Disciplinary Rule 7-101 with Disciplinary Rule 7-102. The
former prohibits a lawyer from intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives of
his client through "reasonably available means permitted by law." The latter
forbids the assertion of a claim when the attorney knows or "when it is obvious"
that such action would serve merely to harass, or when such claim is unwarranted
under existing law. It has become the responsibility of the judiciary to harmonize
these two interests. Sullcor Realty, Inc. v. Battaglino, 81 Misc. 2d 325, 365
N.Y.S.2d 952 (1975).
Without adequate enforcement by the legal profession, these Disciplinary Rules
provide no protection for the public. An ABA Special Committee, chaired by
former Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark and assembled to study the effectiveness of current enforcement procedures, characterized the prevailing attitude of
lawyers toward enforcement as ranging from apathy to outright hostility. Lawyers
failed to report violations of the Code and, rather than cooperate with grievance
committees, exerted their influence to stymie committee action. ABA SPECIAL
COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT: PROBLEMS

& RECOMMEN-

(1970).
The Clark Report noted several obstacles to effective enforcement and offered a
series of recommendations, including a need for active investigation into known
areas of recurrent misconduct, in lieu of investigation based solely upon complaint.
Notwithstanding that such suggestions may aid in an alleviation of the disciplinary
problem, a true solution to the problem will require an adherence to the Code and
full disclosure of its violators.
108. Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 291 (1975).
109. Murdock v. Gerth, 65 Cal. App. 2d 170, 150 P.2d 489 (1944).
DATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
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by a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of that law.' 10
An attorney is not required to weigh the factors of a case in order
to guarantee its success, but must provide his client with a candid opinion of the merits and probable results of pending or contemplated litigation.'' He may pursue a claim as long as there exists
an issue genuinely in doubt,'1 2 even though unsure of the truthfulness of its assertion. He may ethically institute a suit with full
knowledge that it may be barred by an affirmative defense, such as a
running of the statute of limitations, if he has advised his client of
the availability and effect of that defense.' 3 The rationale behind
this relative freedom to file a claim is that the zealous advocate
must be able to present fearlessly a debatable legal issue" 4 as long
as he entertains a reasonable belief in its validity.
An attorney may forfeit this immunity if he institutes a proceeding without probable cause, or if, motivated by personal malice or
swayed by the private interest of his client, "he ceases to be a minister of justice and instead knowingly becomes an instrumentality for
the perpetration of fraud or for the malicious prosecution . . . of a
party against whom he knows his client has no just claim."'" 5 Because of his position as an officer of the court, an attorney has a concurrent obligation to "treat with consideration all persons involved ' in6
the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm.""1
Accordingly, he is held to a higher standard of care in the institution
of a suit than is a layman:
An attorney does not guarantee the soundness of his
opinions . . . however he is expected to possess knowledge of those plain and elementary principles of law which,
although not commonly known may readily be found by
standard research technique . . . . Even with respect to an
unsettled area of the law, an attorney assumes an obligation
...
to undertake reasonable research in an effort to
ascertain relevant legal principles and to make an informed

110. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-109
(1975).
111. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 8 (1975).
112. Tool Research & Eng'r Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 291 (1975).
113. ABA COMM. ON
OPINIONS, No. 694 (1963).

114.
115.
116.
(1975).

ETHICS

&

PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY,

INFORMAL

Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947).
Id. at 241, 28 N.W.2d at 791.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 7-10
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decision as to a course of conduct
based on an intelligent
17
assessment of the problem.'
Most notably, when reliance on his opinion affords the client an

exemption from liability for damages in a subsequent action,"'
the attorney must prepare a researched assessment of the claim.
An attorney may violate this duty of care by failing to investigate the
law and underlying facts of a claim, or by instituting a proceeding
which no other attorney would regard as viable." 9

The availability to a client of the absolute defense of good faith
reliance upon the advice of counsel, which constitutes probable cause

for the institution of a malpractice action, 120 may prompt a defendant
physician to sue the attorney representing the patient, rather than,

or in addition to, the patient himself. Particularly in actions as complex

and time-consuming as medical

malpractice,

prospective

plaintiffs are likely to rely upon counsel in determining whether or
not to prosecute. In such instances, suit against the attorney is
hindered not so much by an inability to allege want of probable
cause as by a difficulty in alleging malice. Although an attorney who
is himself actuated by malice or who is aware of the malicious

motives of his client' 2 ' may have demonstrated this improper motive,
such situations are rare.

The permissive inference of malice,

although inconclusive, may fill this void satisfactorily.
III.

APPLYING MALICIOUS PROSECUTION TO
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

Few courts have yet confronted the difficulty of allowing an
117. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 358, 530 P.2d 589, 595, 118'Cal. Rptr. 621,
627 (1975).
118. Cf. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL
OPINIONS, No. 335 (1974), concerning the duty of an attorney in providing opinions
for exemption of registration under the Securities Act of 1933. See also ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 6-101(a)(2), (3) (1975), applicable to conduct in furnishing legal opinions which involves "indifference and a
consistent failure to carry out the obligations he has assumed to his client." FORMAL
OPINIONS, No. 335, supra at n.1, citing ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1273 (1973).
119. The reasonableness of an attorney's actions may be negated by a showing
of interest in the subject matter and outcome of a suit. See Adkin v. Pillen, 136
Mich. 682, 100 N.W. 176 (1904). In the area of medical malpractice, attorney
interest beyond that which is commonly expected of the profession may be evidenced by two courses of conduct, both in violation of professional ethics: the
solicitation of clients, a practice commonly referred to as "ambulance-chasing,"
and the advancement of funds for the payment of living or medical expenses,
subject to reimbursement only upon a favorable settlement. See In re Meck, 51
Ohio App. 237, 200 N.E. 478 (1935).
120. See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
121. Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947).
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action in malicious prosecution as a remedy to the institution of
spurious medical malpractice suits. Only recently has an increasing
number of suits 22 compounded the problem and provided physicians
with the incentive for counteraction.
An expansion of the allowable scope of malicious prosecution in
order to extend to medical malpractice the cautious liberality which
the action has enjoyed in cases of injury suffered in administrative
proceedings123 is currently unlikely. While the judicial attitude
disfavoring the action does not mandate its foreclosure in cases
where the proof requirements have been met, the pervasive fear of
discouraging access to the courts precludes a loosening of these proof
requirements in response to particular tort actions, such as medical
malpractice. 2 4 In the majority of jurisdictions, the necessity of establishing want of probable cause and malice remains an obstacle to
a successful suit.' 25 In the large minority of jurisdictions which do
not permit malicious prosecution actions in which there has been no
injury to property or arrest of the person, it is unlikely that the
abuse of the judicial system by those filing unfounded claims will
prompt an expansion of the doctrine in order to include these, and
other, civil suits.
A.

Present Case Law

Although there have not yet been any successful counteractions
in malicious prosecution by doctors in response to medical malpractice claims, there have been a small number of adventurous
attempts brought either as malicious prosecution claims or substantially similar causes of action. Foster v. McClain126 was filed as
a libel action against three attorneys, individually and as partners,
and against the doctor's former patient. The complaint alleged that
the patient, through her attorneys, had filed three separate damage
suits fcr medical malpractice in which she falsely and maliciously
alleged that Dr. Foster had left a foreign substance, described as a
sponge, in her abdomen. Two of the original malpractice claims
were voluntarily dismissed and the third was dismissed after judgment by the trial court. Evidence presented in the malpractice
trial revealed that the discomfort the patient had experienced after
surgery was probably a reaction to the cotton sutures which had
closed the surgical incision. In a subsequent operation performed by
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See
See
See
See
251

note 3 supra.
note 25 supra.
text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
So. 2d 179 (La. 1971).
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the doctor, a cotton suture or a piece of cotton was removed from the
area of incision. Dr. Foster testified that, at the time of the second
operation, he may have commented on the discovery of the cotton.
Dr. Foster was successful at the trial level, even though the judg-

ment did not stand on appeal. A jury awarded him $33,000 in his
libel action. The defendants' motion for a new trial was denied as
to the attorneys but granted as to the defendant McClain. The
defendant-attorneys appealed. After a review of the evidence introduced at the malpractice trial, the appellate court ruled that, as a
matter of law, Dr. Foster had failed to meet his burden of proof on
the issues of probable cause and malice.
Because of the peculiar nature of the libel action under Louisiana

law, Foster was very similar to an action for malicious prosecution.
Under the distinctive civil law libel and slander provisions of Louisiana, the extension of privilege to allegations made pursuant to a

judicial proceeding requires not only that the allegations be relevant or material,1 27 but also that there be probable cause and an

absence of actual malice. In common law jurisdictions this privilege
is derived from the first amendment 28 and depends only on a showing of relevancy and materiality. These additional prerequisites
liken the Louisiana action closely to the action of malicious prosecu-

tion, although the requirement of favorable termination is absent.
The burden of proof, in either action, is upon the plaintiff to show
malice and want of probable cause.

In its analysis, the Foster court essentially equated probable
cause with an attorney's belief in the client's allegations:
127. See Sarelas v. Makin, 32 Ill. App. 2d 339, 177 N.E.2d 867 (1961); Meier v.
Combs, 297 N.E.2d 436 (Ind. App. 1973). But see Pettitt v. Levy, 28 Cal. App. 3d
484, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1972), requiring only that the publication have some connection with the proceeding.
128. Protection secured by the first amendment's guarantee of free speech extends to the inflictor of a potentially defamatory statement either by virtue of an
immunity conferred by public policy upon those involved in judicial and quasijudicial proceedings or by virtue of the status of the victim. Extensive material is
available on the immunity in the judicial function. See cases in Annot., 42
A.L.R.2d 825 (1955); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 941 (1955); 155 A.L.R. 1346 (1945).
For a development of the protection afforded because of the status of the victim,
see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (prohibiting public officials
from recovering damages for a statement relating to official conduct unless made
with actual malice); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending
this protection to statements made about "public figures"). But see Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), in which the majority retracted from the plurality
position taken three years earlier in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971) and held that absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the
community, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects
of his life.
Although not specifically enumerated in the first amendment, the right of access

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:653

Nothing in the record indicates . . . that at the time of

the filing of the suit, the attorneys had any reason to doubt
Mrs. McClain's statements made to them that it was a
"piece of cotton about the size of a finger" . . . . [T]he
record fails to indicate that the attorneys could have known
that the allegations made in the petition were untrue ....
The defendants had no reason to doubt Mrs. McClain's
story. It is clear that something was removed from Mrs.
McClain as a result of the second operation, and whether it
was a piece of cotton suture that had been used to close the
surgical incision, or whether in fact it was a piece of cotton
inadvertently left in the incision, was a matter which could
only be proven by a thorough
pretrial investigation as well
29
as a trial on the merits.

By delaying the attorney's duty to investigate the viability of a
claim until pretrial investigation, the court substituted a presumption of the truthfulness of a client's allegations for a showing of
probable cause. One plausible explanation for this unusual position
could be the inherent difficulty of proving a medical malpractice
injury. This explanation would, however, result in a postponement
of the duty to investigate in all medical malpractice suits, barring
the presence of actual malice or vindictiveness.
Perhaps a better explanation of Foster would limit this distortion of the probable cause issue to the particular facts of the case
and others like it. Such cases typically involve situations where
foreign objects are left in the body following surgery. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is often applied to permit an inference of
negligence (and at least initial avoidance of expert testimony) once
certain circumstances surrounding the injury have been established.
The underlying factual framework could be unraveled only in
pretrial investigation, until which time the attorney would be bound
by the allegations of his client. The great majority of medical
malpractice cases, however, are not factually suitable for the application of res ipsa loqtitur, and require evidence of a standard of
care. The Foster rationale on probable cause would be inapplicable
to the court has been deemed to be one aspect of the right to petition the government. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
The Supreme Court has held in certain circumstances that due process of law
prohibits a state from denying access to the courts solely on the basis of wealth.
See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (right of indigent to obtain a
divorce, irrespective of ability to pay court fees); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956) (right of indigent in criminal proceeding to receive a transcript of the trial
proceeding free of cost). The Court has, however, upheld a federal statute mandating that all debtors in voluntary bankruptcy proceedings pay a $50 filing fee.
In re Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
129. Foster v. McClain, 251 So. 2d 179, 182 (La. 1971).
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to these cases, which would still demand for the establishment of
probable cause that the attorney conduct some independent research into his client's claim before prosecution.
In addition to deviating from the recognized concept of probable
cause, the Foster court also confined the malice requisite for a
circumvention of the libel privilege to actual malice, thereby excluding legal malice. Simultaneously, the court embraced a new
standard of reckless disregard:
The record is void of any evidence indicating that the allegations were made with malicious intent or through
feelings of ill will towards the doctor. The libel action
could be sustained, however, if it were shown that the
allegations were made with a reckless disregard for
whether or not the allegations were true. We do not believe the record supports such a finding. 30
Traditionally, the protection against the plaintiff's "reckless disregard" has resulted from a concern for the "rights" of the defendant.
Although the standard of reckless disregard could be interpreted to
impose upon the plaintiff's attorney the duty to investigate the
veracity of his client's claim, as well as its legal basis, in order not to
infringe recklessly on the defendant's right to be free from malicious and groundless suits, the Foster court's formulation requires
only that the plaintiff's attorney not recklessly disregard the fact
that his allegations may not, in fact, be true.
The hardship imposed by the requirement of alleging malice in
the institution of the original procedure is further demonstrated in
Spencer v. Burglass,131 a more recent Louisiana case. Dr. Spencer
filed a malicious prosecution action against Burglass, an attorney,
for filing and litigating a medical malpractice suit without any
expert medical testimony. The defendant filed an exception of no
cause of action, asserting that plaintiff's petition failed to allege
malice. Judgment was granted with leave to amend. Upon the
plaintiff's failure to amend, the case was dismissed. The plaintiff
appealed the dismissal to the court of appeals, arguing that she could
not allege malice in fact and therefore could not amend. Under
those circumstances, she requested that the judgment against her
be treated as a final, and therefore appealable, judgment of dismissal. Her request was refused.
An assessment of the impact of Spencer is problematic in light
of the case's early dismissal. Decided after Foster, Spencer may
merely reiterate the Louisiana requirement of proof of actual malice,
130.
131.

Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
288 So. 2d 68 (La. 1974).
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which requirement is not satisfied simply by an inference of malice.
If so, its holding may be of limited value in the majority of jurisdictions, which accept proof of either actual or legal malice. However,
the impact of the dismissal may be more substantial. The claim in
malicious prosecution was predicated upon a malpractice action in
which no expert testimony was offered. If the deficiency of the
complaint was solely its failure to allege malice, the remaining elements of the action having been alleged, then inferring malice from
a showing of want of probable cause has been foreclosed by the
court's opinion. This interpretation would permit the institution of
medical malpractice suits which have no foundation in expert testimony and would bar any answering countersuits for malicious prosesuch testimony, the malpractice suit
cution, even though without
13 2
would lack a legal basis.
B.

Problems Confronting Physicians Bringing
an Action for Malicious Prosecution

The infrequency of actions for malicious prosecution and their
consistent lack of success indicate the difficulties confronting the
physician who pursues such a cause of action. A large number of
jurisdictions have continued to withhold the remedy through the
somewhat arbitrary interference with the person or property requirement. In those jurisdictions which permit malicious prosecution
actions predicated upon civil suits, irrespective of interference with
property or special injury, the difficulties of establishing want of
probable cause and malice have appeared insurmountable.
Notwithstanding its operation as an effective bar to the litigation
of counterclaims in malicious prosecution, the termination requirement is not a significant obstacle to the cause of action. Although
requiring the plaintiff suing for malicious prosecution to plead that
the original action has terminated in his favor, the requirement of
probable cause would preclude a malicious prosecution action in
the absence of favorable termination 33 even if there were no ter132. To date, the progress of one other physician's action in malicious prosecution, Kauffman v. A.H. Robins Co., 223 Tenn. 515, 448 S.W.2d 400 (1969), has
been reported, although its ultimate disposition remains undisclosed. The plaintiff
Kauffman, a pharmacist, was investigated by the State Board of Pharmacy on
charges of substituting a medical preparation for the defendant drug company's
product. Subsequently exonerated, the pharmacist brought an action for malicious
prosecution in a Tennessee Circuit Court. The defendant maintained that Tennessee
did not permit an action in malicious prosecution and entered a demurrer. The
Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the demurrer and remanded to the circuit
court for further proceedings.
133. See text accompanying notes 85-92 supra.
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mination rule. The major consequence of the termination require-

ment is instead its exclusion of counterclaims.

Although this

consequence by itself is not detrimental to the physician, only the
hardy will "assume so quickly the expense of a second suit, unless
. reasonably assured of success." 3 4 On the assumption that the
menace of a present counterclaim has more impact than the speculative threat of a future counteraction, the potential deterrent value
*

of malicious prosecution actions may be limited.
Certainly the most difficult task confronting the physician is
establishing want of probable cause. Where evidence of bad faith is

lacking, the physician must demonstrate that, considering only the
facts known at the time of filing, the institution of the suit was unreasonable. If expert testimony has been utilized,1 35 the reasonableness of the plaintiff's action is conclusively established. Since the

issues of breach of duty and causation in the field of medicine are
complex, the plaintiff, through his use of and reliance upon a medi-

cal expert, has demonstrated a reasonable belief in the viability of
134. See note 39 supra.
135. In the vast majority of medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff is required
to establish both the standard of care and a deviation therefrom through the use of
competent expert medical testimony. See, e.g., Lewis v. Read, 80 N.J. Super. 148,
170, 193 A.2d 255, 267 (App. Div. 1963). The standard of care owed by a physician
is measured "in light of the ordinary skill possessed and applied by other members
of his profession in like situations," and demands the exercise of ordinary care and
diligence in the treatment of a case and his best judgment in the application of
skill therein. Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 86 (Me. 1974). A physician is
presumed to have employed the requisite skill in the performance of his medical
duties. Lane v. Calvert, 215 Md. 457, 138 A.2d 902 (1958). As long as he has
administered a course of treatment recognized by a segment of the medical profession to be permissible, he has not breached the standard imposed upon him.
See, e.g., Christian v. Wilmington Hosp. Ass'n, 50 Del. 550, 135 A.2d 727 (1957).
But see Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (failure of ophthalmologist to perform glaucoma test on patient under 40 held negligent as a matter of
law despite uncontradicted expert testimony that this was universal medical practice). See also Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. App. 2d 461,
235 N.E.2d 671 (1968), where the fact that the treatment administered had been
the usual or customary one did not of itself preclude the possibility that the practice
was negligent. See generally 20 N.Y.L.F. 669 (1975).
Where expert testimony is mandated and none is introduced, there is no issue
of fact upon which a jury is competent to judge. Because of the rules of procedure
in a number of jurisdictions, however, the testimony of the defendant physician
may be introduced by the plaintiff as expert testimony. See Lawless v. Calaway,
24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944); Anderson v. Florence, 288 Minn. 351, 181 N.W.2d
873 (1970); Oleskiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965). It
is unlikely, though, that the defendant, as an adverse witness, will offer the testimony on a deviation from the standard of care necessary to establish a prima facie
case of malpractice. As an exception to the hearsay rule, rule 803(18) of the
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE permits the introduction upon cross-examination
of learned treatises as substantive evidence of a deviation from the standard of care.
See FED. R. EvID. 803(18), Advisory Committee Notes (1975).
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his suit, as an objective evaluation-that of the medical expert-of
36
its merit.
Perhaps most important to the physicians who defend malpractice claims are those suits which are filed without expert testimony.
A major problem then faced by the physician is that the absence of
expert testimony will not, of necessity, demonstrate either that a
proceeding was undertaken with a disregard for the rights of the
physician or instituted without probable cause. The potential plaintiff may have been unable to obtain expert testimony prior to the
institution of a suit because the statute of limitations would have run
before he could do so. 37 An attorney may have discovered too late
that the testimony upon which he had relied was not forthcoming,
or that it would have been inadequate to establish the standard of
care. An attorney may hai'e proceeded with an action in the hope
3
of obtaining a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur,"
' thereby avoid136. Although reliance on the introduction of expert medical testimony as the
test for establishing probable cause may be inequitable upon consideration of the
high cost of procuring such testimony and the general reluctance of physicians to
testify against one another, there appears little doubt that the introduction of such
testimony is sufficient, although perhaps not necessary, for the demonstration of
good faith.
137. The problem of the prospective claim which is unresearched and is facing
the expiration of the limitations period may be partially alleviated by statutory
enactment. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(a) (Page Legis. Bull. 1975),
granting the potential plaintiff 180 days subsequent to the running of the statute of
limitations in which to file a claim, provided that within the statutory period he had
notified the prospective defendant of his intent to bring suit. This 180-day extension would presumably provide adequate time to research the claim and adjudge
its merit.
138. Judicial recognition of a "conspiracy of silence" among doctors may have
led to the elimination of a need for expert testimony in a growing number of cases.
In certain situations, the manner and circumstances of an injury, as distinguished
from the nature of the injury itself, may justify the application of res ipsa loquitur
and permit an inference of negligence without the introduction of expert testimony.
E.g., Truhlicka v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 162 Kan. 535, 178 P.2d 252 (1947). The
application of the doctrine is generally limited to situations in which the negligence lies within the comprehension of laymen, and may in reality be an extension
of the "common knowledge" doctrine, in recognition of the public's augmented
knowledge of medical practices. See Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases & The
Reluctant Expert, 16 CATH. U.L. REv. 158 (1966).
The doctrine has most frequently been applied to cases of foreign objects left
in the patient's body following surgery. E.g., Leonard v. Watsonville Community
Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305 P.2d 36 (1956). For the application of the doctrine to
cases of surgical or radiation burns, see, e.g., Becker v. Eisenstodt, 60 N.J. Super.
240, 158 A.2d 706 (App. Div. 1960). Compare Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal. App.
2d 43, 208 P.2d 445 (1949) (res ipsa loquitur applied to surgery case where the
unconscious patient had no knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
injury) with Gould v. Winokur, 98 N.J. Super. 554, 237 A.2d 916 (L. Div. 1968)
(accessibility of knowledge deemed irrelevant to a traditional notion of liability
based on fault). For an analysis of the application of the doctrine to the cases of
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ing the need for expert testimony, only to have been informed that

his client's injury does not come within the purview of "common
knowledge." None of these courses of conduct demonstrates ab
initio any impropriety on the part of the patient or his attorney. 3 9
Since the absolute defense of good faith reliance upon the advice
of counsel may be available to the client, a prudent physician should
sue both the patient and the patient's former counsel. The hardship
in establishing lack of probable cause against an attorney stems not

so much from the legal requirements of malicious prosecution as
from the reluctance of the courts, based on public policy, to uphold
such an action brought against a formerly adverse counsel. A recent
California decision, Norton v. Hines,140 rejected the attempt of a
former defendant to demonstrate that a duty of reasonable care was
owed to him by the opposing attorney. Norton, a named co-de-

fendant in an action in which no supporting testimony was offered,
countersued in simple negligence against the attorneys who had
initiated the original proceeding.

An alternate cause of action was

stated in malicious prosecution against the former plaintiff, but a
demurrer was sustained for failure to allege malice.

Urging the court to adopt a definition of duty as "the risk
reasonably to be perceived," Norton asserted that he was a foreseeable third party to whom the adverse attorneys had owed a duty of
reasonable care.' 4 ' Norton claimed that in advising their client to
pursue an action for which there was no support, these attorneys
had acted negligently and in dereliction of the standard of care imposed upon attorneys similarly situated. While agreeing, however,
unknown causation and the recurring problem of the allocation of risk, see Thode,
The Unconscious Patient: Who Should Bear the Risk of Unexplained Injuries to a
Healthy Part of His Body, 1969 UTAH L. REv. I. See also Louisell & Williams,
Res Ipsa Loquitur-Its Future in Medical Malpractice Cases, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 252
(1960).
139. The attorney may have realized that he was unable to prosecute an action
properly because of limited resources or knowledge, and thus may have withdrawn
from the action.
140. 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975).
141. Norton's argument was an attempt to extend even further the foreseeability
doctrine of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
In that case, the Supreme Court of California departed from the concept of tort
liability based on the "zone of danger" in favor of measuring the duty to onlookers
and third parties in terms of foreseeability and found liability for the mental distress
suffered by an onlooker to a traffic accident. Dillon, however, awarded damages
under the foreseeability rationale only to a secondary victim of a tort. Norton
attempted to apply this rationale to obtain damages as a primary victim. The innovation in Dillon, however, has been denounced widely both inside and outside
of California because of the arbitrary standards it promotes. See Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress:Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in California and Other States,
25 HASTIN s L.J. 1248 (1974).
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that the traditionally strict requirement of privity of contract for the
imposition of tort liability had been eased in certain situations, and
that attorneys had, in the past, been held liable to third parties, the
court noted that the imposition of a duty had been limited to situations in which the third party was an intended beneficiary of the
attorney's conduct:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a
matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction
was intended to affect the plaintiff ....
Since an adverse party could not by definition be the intended
beneficiary of adverse counsel's performance, an extension of the
formulation of foreseeable risk was held to be unwarranted.
Suggesting that a proper pleading would have stated a cause of
action against the attorneys in malicious prosecution, the court reaffirmed the interest in a public policy favoring free access to the
courts. In light of the court's emphasis on attorney freedom, it is
likely that nothing short of a repeated instigation of frivolous suits
1 43
would suffice to meet this demanding burden of proof.
In limited situations, it may be possible to prove actual malice
in the form of ill will, particularly when the patient displays vindictiveness outside the courtroom. In Jankelson v. Cisel,144 a patient dissatisfied with the treatment she had received from her dentist complained of his services to several dental societies and
governmental agencies. During consultation with other dentists, she
further denigrated her original treatment as well as the treatment
of an additional dentist whom she had consulted subsequently.
Receiving no satisfaction from her complaints, she filed a malpractice action against the original dentist. While the action was pending, sfie dismissed her attorney and entered a voluntary nonsuit
for failure to prepare adequately. In response to her filing, the
dentist instituted a libel and slander action, to which the patient
counterclaimed in malpractice. Judgment in the libel and slander
action was rendered for the physician and the counterclaim dismissed, in the absence of competent expert testimony, for failure
to establish a prima facie case.
Although one might arguably characterize the conduct of this
142.

Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 920, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 239 (1975),

quoting Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
143.
144.

See Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932).
3 Wash. App. 139, 473 P.2d 202 (1970).
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patient as malicious, it is more likely that actual malice indicates
a willfulness that appears to be lacking in Jankelson. Admittedly,
such instances of actual malice are rare and are not representative
of the typical malpractice action. The institution of malicious prosecution actions in response to such cases would not provide a
counterbalance to the mainstream of medical malpractice cases.
Should malice during the pendency of a proceeding be construed
to require proof of actual malice, or a reckless disregard for the
truth, as indicated by the decisions in Spencer and Foster, it is unlikely that the physician will be able to meet his burden of proof in
situations other than those evincing ill will similar to Jankelson.
In the absence of evidence of ill will, perhaps the only available
option is a demonstration of a reckless disregard for the rights of
the physician. There is, however, no indication that this alternative has yet been pursued by physicians, so its ultimate value
remains much in doubt. Its effectiveness would also be greatly
undermined by the adoption of the Foster and Spencer courts' interpretation of malice. Such an adoption retreats from the longaccepted definition of actual malice 145 and would produce an unnecessary curtailment of malicious prosecution actions.
Should the accepted definition of "reckless disregard" be
extended to malpractice claims, thus permitting the inference of
malice from a showing of want of probable cause, a greater number of situations may support a malicious prosecution action. The
repeated instigation of suits based on the same cause of action,
each pleaded differently but all lost, 146 may be sufficient evidence to
constitute malice. Extensive delay at trial, where the proceedings
147
span many years and the case must be docketed many times,
may also be evidence of disregard.
When treated individually, the elements of malicious prosecution
provide substantial barriers for the wrongfully sued physician.
When viewed cumulatively, in light of judicial sentiment against
the action, the barriers appear almost overwhelming. The necessary
conclusion is that the action of malicious prosecution as it is now
constituted is exceedingly difficult to utilize.
C. Reformation of the Cause of Action
In its present state, malicious prosecution offers only the slight145. See text accompanying notes 100-03 supra.
146. E.g., Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932); Shedd v.
Patterson, 302 Ill. 355, 134 N.E. 705 (1922).
147. Butter v. Brookdale Hosp., 67 Misc. 2d 727, 324 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1971).
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est prospect of providing a remedy for the maligned doctor. Because of the judiciary's fear that malicious prosecution actions
will become unmanageable if made available to physicians, the
courts have restricted the efficacy of the remedy by imposing strict
requirements on the cause of action. Although lacking probative
evidence in support of this fear, the judiciary also clings to its intuitive notions that reprisals in malicious prosecution will be frequent
and their deterrent value significant. Neither supposition is necessarily correct, although each is widely held.
A gradual retraction from this position would greatly enhance the
potency of the remedy without belittling judicial fears. This retraction can partially be accomplished by permitting a greater liberality
in pleading the cause of action. This suggestion focuses on the foreclosure of the remedy in jurisdictions which follow the minority
rule requiring arrest, seizure of property, or special injury prior to
a stating of the cause of action, and thus demands a total abrogation of the minority rule in order for the remedy to be effective.
The retraction would be accomplished more thoroughly by loosening the proof requirements governing the various elements of the action. This suggestion concentrates on the difficulty in establishing, as
a matter of law, the elements of the cause of action to the satisfaction of the jury. It is within the latter suggestion that the greater
potential for reformation lies.
A three-fold modification of the action in malicious prosecution
may provide a remedy for the doctor who has defended against a
spurious claim. First, the filing of a counterclaim during the pendency of the original proceeding may provide the physician with a
less expensive and more immediate remedy. It could also provide
a greater deterrent against the institution of spurious claims. Adjudication of the counterclaim could await disposition of the original
action, in order to minimize the unfairness to the original plaintiff
while maximizing judidial economy and fairness to the defendant.
Second, an inquiry into probable cause for the institution of a suit
by an attorney should include the extent to which the attorney has
investigated the factual and legal bases of his client's claim. In an
effort to determine the reasonableness of the advice given to his
client, consideration should be given to the time allocated and the
sources consulted by the attorney. Despite the evidentiary difficulties of this inquiry, the imposition of a duty to investigate would
broaden the standard of care within which an attorney operates,
so that a consideration of the rights of the potential defendant would
be required. Unlike the imposition of a duty running to the defendant as a third party beneficiary of the employment contract be-
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tween attorney and client, as advocated in Norton v. Hines,148 the
duty to investigate merely reflects the obligation of the attorney
to the public to avoid spurious claims. Third, the definition of
1 49
malice as the "reckless disregard for the rights of the defendant
should be accepted in all jurisdictions as an alternative to the already accepted definition of ill will. This extension would complement the standard of care imposed upon the attorney and would demand a further evaluation of the merits of a claim prior to filing.
These modifications, if adopted, could facilitate the institution
of malicious prosecution suits without imposing undue restrictions on
access to the courts or on the right to litigate. By imposing a greater burden upon the attorney to whom the knowledge of the law is
available, rather than on the proponent, the judiciary could effectively decrease the number of spurious claims filed while promoting a general accountability by attorneys for their conduct.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The medical profession and its subscribing public confront a
medical malpractice crisis which may be reaching epidemic proportions. The lack of public and medical endorsement of screening devices has lessened the likelihood of any alleviation of the
problem in the near future. In search of a panacea for their legal
woes, physicians have stumbled upon the tort of malicious prosecution and demanded that it become the impossible-an effective deterrent to litigation through the imposition of heavy fines on those
patients who cannot emerge victorious from the malpractice arena.
While there is little doubt that malicious prosecution will never
approximate that goal, there exists much room for debate on its
potential deterrent and compensatory values.
Any true potential for success on a malicious prosecution claim
is contingent upon a loosening of the limitations which circumscribe
the tort and a retreat from the paternalism which guides the courts'
interaction with the public. Fearing a denial of access to the courts,
the judiciary has neglected its duty to protect the unjustly accused
defendant. At the present time, the action in malicious prosecution with its nearly insurmountable burdens of probable cause and
malice is unlikely to offer that protection to any defendant. The
physician confronts the additional obstacle of a judiciary which,
rather than hinder malpractice litigation, has fostered it through
an extension of res ipsa loquitur,150 a gradual retraction of the local148.
149.
150.

49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975).
See notes 102-04 supra and accompanying text.
See note 138 supra.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:653

ity rule, 151 and the permissible introduction of medical treatises as
expert testimony. 52 Because of this judicial attitude, it may be impossible for the physician to allege malice and want of probable
cause.
Self-regulation by the legal profession may be one successful
method of controlling spurious suits. The attorney should establish, if he has not already done so, a procedure involving preliminary investigations and research, which, if conducted, would free
him from concerns that a suit in malicious prosecution may be successfully litigated. A showing that the attorney followed these individual standards may provide sufficient evidence to convince the
victorious physician that the lawyer performed his tasks in good faith.
The attorney who disregards the legal rights of a physiciah, however, may soon learn that his failure to self-regulate may lead to
the imposition of regulation by others.
Absent adequate self-regulation by the legal profession, spurious
medical malpractice suits can be controlled only if the action for
malicious prosecution is modified in such a way as to make it a
viable option for the defendant physician. If courts begin to allow
malicious prosecution counterclaims with the pendency of the original action, if attorneys are required to investigate their clients'
allegations earlier, and if the malice requirement is modified so it
can be satisfied by a showing of reckless disregard, malicious prosecution will be an effective weapon for the physician. Otherwise,
doctors will be frustrated by the reluctance of the judiciary to meet
the changing demands of the current medical malpractice crisis.
PEARL KISNER
151. In many jurisdictions, the standard of care to which a defendant physician
will be held is the standard ordinarily observed by other physicians, either in the
defendant's locality or in a similar locality. See, e.g., McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241
Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950). A number of jurisdictions, however, have totally
disregarded geographic boundaries and have permitted a medical witness from a
locality other than that in which the defendant practices to testify. See Carbone v.
Warburton, II N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953).
152. See note 135 supra.

